It is my pleasure to welcome you, our guests and Reserve Bank personnel, to a dinner I gladly host in your honour. I know that you have formally been welcomed to the Reserve Bank this morning by Mr Plenderleith. But at a seminar of this stature, co-hosted by our good friends at the Bank for International Settlements, I, as Governor, felt it correct to re-iterate a warm welcome. I am especially delighted that we are able to co-host this reserve management seminar as I believe that all of us can learn from each other's experiences regarding this important central-bank function.  I know you have had a long day at the seminar and, I believe, a productive one, so I shall keep my speech brief. I have chosen not to focus on reserve management in the South African Reserve Bank, as the topic was covered to some degree in the seminar this afternoon, but rather to talk to you briefly about inflating targeting. As you probably know, inflation targeting, initially adopted by New Zealand in 1990, has been the choice of a growing number of central banks in both industrialised and emerging countries. As on November 2000, authors Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel had counted 19 inflation-targeting countries. Since then, the numbers have increased. Precisely by how many is debatable and will depend on the precise definition of inflation-targeting countries but I note that the merits of inflation targeting continue to be debated in the US. Inflation targeting in South Africa was formally introduced on 23 February 2000 with the announcement of a 3 to 6 per cent target for 2002. At that time, CPIX inflation - the rate we target - stood at 7 per cent. (Just for your information, we define CPIX as the CPI excluding the interest cost of mortgage bonds, for the historical metropolitan and other urban areas.) The target range of 3 to 6 per cent set was an ambitious one. Whilst there may be debates today about whether the target range was set at the correct level, it is important to note that for both the credibility of the central bank, as well as the management of expectations in respect of inflation being a problem, the target range had to be set at a level which would properly demonstrate commitment to lowering inflation. In spite of the above-mentioned quite ambitious target, by September 2001, twelve-month CPIX inflation had decelerated to 5,8% per cent and many analysts thought that the 2002 target would be met fairly easily. To say the least, circumstances changed! The exchange rate depreciation of some 37 per cent in 2001 - that is another interesting story! - mostly in the closing stages of the year, was significantly responsible for pushing up CPIX inflation up to a peak of 11,3% per cent in November 2002. On 12 September 2002, the Reserve Bank's Monetary Policy Committee had announced the fourth and final 100 basis points increase for the year of the Bank's repurchase rate. As you may well imagine, I was not everyone's most-favourite Governor! Fortunately, inflationary pressures have abated, partly related to the rand's appreciation since December 2001 and as reflected in the year-on-year change in CPIX falling to 6,6 per cent in July 2003, and the MPC has seen fit to lower the repo rate. On 14 August 2003, following the most recent meeting of the MPC, the repo rate was further reduced by 100bp to 11 per cent effective from 15 August 2003. (Should there be anyone amongst you interested in the factors weighing on this decision, I refer you to the statement of the Monetary Policy Committee which is on the Reserve Bank website). Whilst a Governor is certainly more popular during a declining interest-rate cycle, rest assured there were critics who felt that the Bank had not been bold enough and should have, at least, reduced the repo rate by 150 basis points! Technically, what the Reserve Bank is doing could more accurately be described as inflation-forecast targeting. Given the roughly 12 to 24-month lag between interest-rate changes and their having their full impact felt on inflation, the repurchase rate is set at a level judged to be consist