

Cyber Risk Underwriting Thematic Review Results

December 2022



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1. Background





Background

- Growing digitisation, connections, big data, cyber threats
- Cyber insurance potentially significant attracted supervisory attention of regulators
- Result Cyber Risk Underwriting Thematic Review
- Relevant emerging risk, warrants further investigation:
 - IAIS 2019 Supervisory Stocktake and IAIS 2020-2024 Strategic Plan
 - PA flavour of the year "Impact of new technologies on financial institutions"
 - Cyber risk underwriting is central to industry discussions

Scope

- Includes insurers that underwrite affirmative cyber risk
- Includes exposures to non-affirmative cyber
- Excludes operational cyber risk faced by insurers



Objectives

Better understanding of status quo, specifically cyber risk:

- Underwriting strategy and insurance products
- Underwriting exposures and potential aggregation
- Challenges faced
- Key themes:
 - Overview of cyber risk underwriting market
 - Size of affirmative cyber risk insurance market
 - Risk appetite to provide affirmative cyber risk cover / not
 - Main affirmative cyber insurance products
 - Key classes / sub-classes of business underwritten
 - Underwriting processes followed / pricing methods used
 - Challenges faced
 - Risk management / mitigation strategies
 - Expected contribution of PA







Outcome - General



Affirmative vs Non-affirmative cyber risk


- Affirmative cyber risk
 - Policies explicitly include cover for cyber-related losses
 - Example: Data restoration insurance policy which covers professional restoration of data loss due to cyber event.

- Non-affirmative cyber risk (silent cyber)
 - Policies do not explicitly include or exclude cover for cyber related losses
 - Example: Malware attack scrambles the controlling system of a factory, resulting in fire or machinery breakdown.




Prudential Authoritu

Submission Information












Exclude non-affirmative cyber risk exposures



Rewording of policy documents


Analyse traditional business lines

Improve underwriting processes




Awareness and Quantification of NA cyber risk exposure

Are insurers aware if they inadvertently offer cyber risk cover on a non-affirmative basis?




Are insurers able to adequately quantify and assess non-affirmative exposures?



- Yes It is possible
- Yes Possible, but very difficult
- Yes- Nearly impossible
- No It is impossible



Quantification methods of NA cyber risk exposure



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
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
Outcome - Affirmative Cyber




Affirmative Cyber Composition Overview



Total Cyber Premiums and Policies




Affirmative Cyber Claims and Combined Ratios



Claims ratio = Net incurred claims (NIC) / Net Earned Premium (NEP) Combined ratio = (NIC + net expenses + net commissions) / NEP



Distribution Channels and Underwriting Obstacles



- Direct / internet
- Brokers
- Agents / UMAs
- Other (1st party cells)

Lack of data


Lack of cyber expertise

Costly / detailed underwriting process


Risk of over / under pricing



Qualitative vs. Quantitative Underwriting Data



Approaches used to underwrite cyber risk:



- A vendor model
- Expert judgment
- Scenario analysis
- Other approach

- Deterministic approach
- Internal pricing model
- Combination of approaches

Challenges and Trends

- 1. Systemic nature of potential events
- 2. Lack of historical data to quantify risks
- 3. Broadness of coverage
- 4. Risk of underpricing
- 5. Lack of specialised underwriters / reinsurance coverage
- 6. Dynamic and constantly evolving environment




- 2. Premiums charged are increasing rapidly
- 3. There are more new buyers
- 4. Higher limit options are sought






Risk Mitigation



- Reinsurance / retrocession
- Other risk mitigation instruments
- Risk sharing agreements with other entities
- Other

Premium and Claim Retention Ratios



Retention ratio = net / gross






Outcome - Not Writing Affirmative Cyber




Insurers planning to provide affirmative cyber



- Number of insurers writing affirmative cyber
- Insurers planning to write cyber in future
- Insurers not planning to write cyber in future
- Number of insurers not writing affirmative cyber

Stress testing of NA cyber:



- NA stress scenario incorporated
- NA stress scenario not incorporated
- No response





Outcome - Prudential Supervision



Obstacles and Expected Contributions


- Regulatory business classes / SF do not cater for cyber insurance
- Costly, cumbersome, and lengthy regulatory processes.
- Lack of cyber specific supervisory guidance and standards
- Inability of supervisory framework to adapt to fast paced cyber insurance industry

- Develop clear and concise cyber standards and guidance notes
- Provide support:
 - Education, training, knowledge sharing
 - Increase awareness / understanding of cyber insurance
- Setting industry standards and provide monitoring / oversight




Industry Participation

Participate in anonymous industry data sharing?



Parties responsible for uninsured losses in an extreme cyber risk event?



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3. Conclusions

Conclusions

- Quantitative data is of poor quality or lacking
- Size of affirmative cyber risk insurance market is very small
- Limited risk appetite to provide affirmative cyber risk
- Cyber mainly written in the Liability class
- Mainly annual standalone cyber policies sold via brokers
- Underwriting methods used internal + expert judgement
- Challenges faced lack of data and cyber expertise
- Main risk management strategy is reinsurance
- Industry view expected contribution of PA as regulator
- Refine on-going supervision via insurer discussions and stress tests in ORSAs



